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Abstract 
Currently, there is renewed interest in the prob­
lem, raised by Shafer in 1985, of updating proba­
bilities when observations are incomplete (or set­
valued). This is a fundamental problem, and of 
particular interest for Bayesian networks. Re­
cently, Griinwald and Halpern have shown that 
commonly used updating strategies fail here, ex­
cept under very special assumptions. We propose 
a new rule for updating probabilities with in­
complete observations. Our approach is deliber­
ately conservative: we make no or weak assump­
tions about the so-called incompleteness mecha­
nism that produces incomplete observations. We 
model our ignorance about this mechanism by 
a vacuous lower prevision, a tool from the the­
ory of imprecise probabilities, and we derive a 
new updating rule using coherence arguments. In 
general, our rule produces lower posterior prob­
abilities, as well as partially determinate deci­
sions. This is a logical consequence of the igno­
rance about the incompleteness mechanism. We 
show how the new rule can properly address the 
apparent paradox in the 'Monty Hall' puzzle. In 
addition, we apply it to the classification of new 
evidence in Bayesian networks constructed using 
expert knowledge. We provide an exact algo­
rithm for this task with linear-time complexity, 
also for multiply connected nets. 
1 Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the problem of updating 
probabilities with observations that are incomplete, or set­
valued. To our knowledge, this problem was first given se­
rious consideration in 1985 by Shafer [12]. He showed that 
it is at the heart of well-known puzzles, such as the Monty 
•A longer version with proofs is available [2]. 
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Hall puzzle. Moreover, his main argument was that the 
right way to update probabilities with incomplete observa­
tions requires knowledge of the incompleteness mechanism 
(called protocol in Shafer's paper), i.e., the mechanism that 
is responsible for turning a complete observation into an 
incomplete one, and he rightly observed that "we do not 
always have protocols in practical problems". 
In practise, people often assume a condition known as 
coarsening at random (CAR [4]), or its specialisation to 
missing data problems, called missing at random (MAR 
[8]). These represent a form of partial knowledge about 
the incompleteness mechanism. Remarkably, when CAR 
holds, the common conditioning rule updates probabili­
ties correctly. This may be one reason that Shafer's work 
seems to have been largely overlooked until 2002,1 when 
an interesting paper by Grunwald and Halpern [5] offered 
a renewed perspective of the subject. This work argues 
strongly that CAR holds rather infrequently, and it enforces 
Shafer's viewpoint concerning the difficulties in knowing 
and modelling the incompleteness mechanism. These two 
points taken together raise a fundamental issue in probabil­
ity theory, which also presents a serious problem for appli­
cations: how should beliefs be updated when there is little 
or no information about the incompleteness mechanism? 
We believe that the first step is to allow for ignorance about 
the mechanism in our models. This is the approach that 
we take in this paper. In Section 3, we make our model 
as conservative as possible by representing the ignorance 
about the incompleteness mechanism by a vacuous lower 
prevision, a tool from the theory of imprecise probabilities2 
[ 14]. This theory is a generalisation of the Bayesian theory 
of probability [3], with a closely related behavioural inter­
pretation, and based on similar criteria of rationality. Be­
cause we are aware that readers may not be familiar with 
imprecise probability models, we present a brief discus-
1But see the discussion by Walley in [14, Section 6.11], which 
has been a source of inspiration for the present work; and some 
papers by Halpern et at. [6, 7]. 
2See [15] for a gentle introduction to imprecise probabilities 
with emphasis on artificial intelligence. 
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sion in Section 2, with pointers to the relevant literature. 
Loosely speaking, the vacuous lower prevision is equiva­
lent to the set of all distributions, i.e., it makes all incom­
pleteness mechanisms possible a priori. Our basic model 
follows from this as a necessary consequence, using the ra­
tionality requirement of coherence (a generalisation of the 
requirements of rationality in Bayesian probability theory 
[3]). We illustrate how our basic model works by address­
ing the Monty Hall puzzle, showing that the apparent para­
dox vanishes if the available knowledge about the incom­
pleteness mechanism is properly modelled. 
We then apply our method for dealing with incomplete ob­
servations to the special case of a classification problem, 
where objects are assigned to classes on the basis of the 
values of their attributes. The question we deal with in Sec­
tions 4--6, is how cla�sification should be done when values 
for some of the attributes are missing. We derive a new 
rule for updating, called conservative updating rule, that 
allows us to deal with such missing data without making 
unwarranted assumptions about the mechanism that pro­
duces them. Our rule leads to an imprecise posterior, and 
it may lead to inferences that are partially indeterminate. 
Our method will assign an object to a number of classes, 
rather than to a single class, unless conditions justify pre­
cision. This generalised way to do classification is called 
credal classification in [16]. Arguably this is the best our 
system can do, given the information that is incorporated 
into it. Also, any additional information about the missing 
data mechanism will lead to a new classification that refines 
ours, but can never contradict it by assigning an object to a 
class that was not among our optimal classes. 
We then apply the conservative updating rule to classifi­
cation problems with Bayesian networks. We regard a 
Bayesian net as a tool that formalises expert knowledge and 
is used to classify new evidence, i.e., to select certain val­
ues of a class variable given evidence about the attribute 
values. We develop an exact algorithm for credal classi­
fication with Bayesian nets that is linear in the number of 
children of the class node, also for multiply connected nets. 
This is an important result: it makes the new rule immedi­
ately available for applications; and it shows that it is pos­
sible for the power of robust, conservative, modelling to 
go hand in hand with easy computation, even with multi­
ply connected networks, where the most common tasks are 
NP-hard. 
2 Imprecise probabilities 
The theory of coherent lower previsions (also called the 
theory of imprecise probabilities) [ 14] is an extension of 
the Bayesian theory of (precise) probability [3]. It models 
a subject's uncertainty by looking at his dispositions toward 
taking certain actions, and imposing requirements of ratio­
nality, or consistency, on these dispositions. 
To make this more clear, consider a random variable X that 
may take values in a finite set X. A gamble f on X is a real­
valued function on X. It associates a reward j(x) with any 
possible value x of X. If a subject is uncertain about the 
value of X, he will be disposed to accept certain gambles, 
and to reject others, and we may model his uncertainty by 
looking at which gambles he accepts (or rejects). 
In the Bayesian theory of uncertainty (see for instance [3]), 
it is assumed that a subject can always specify a fair pri ce, 
or prevision, P(J) for j, whatever the information avail­
able to him. P(J) is the unique real number such that he (i) 
accepts to buy the gamble f for a price p, for all p < P(f); 
and (ii) accepts to sell the gamble f for a price q, for all 
q > P(J). In other words, it is essentially assumed that 
for any real number r, the available information allows the 
subject to decide which of t.'Ie following two options he 
prefers: buying f for price r, or selling f for that price. 
It has been argued extensively [ 14] that, especially if little 
information is available about X, there may be prices r 
for which a subject may have no real preference between 
these two options, or in other words, that on the basis of the 
available information he remains undecided about whether 
to buy f or price r or to sell it for that price: he may not be 
disposed to do either. If, as the Bayesian theory requires, 
the subject should choose between these two actions, his 
choice will then not be based on any real preference: it will 
be arbitrary, and not a realistic reflection of the subject's 
dispositions, based on the available information. 
The theory of imprecise probabilities remedies this by al­
lowing a subject to specify two numbers: P(j) and P(j). 
His lower prev i sion P(j) for f is the greatest real num­
ber p such that he is disposed to buy the gamble f for all 
prices strictly smaller than p, and his upper prev ision P(j) 
for f is the smallest real number q such that he is disposed 
to sell f for all prices strictly greater than q. For any r 
between P(J) and P(j), the subject does not express a 
preference between buying or selling f for price r. Since 
selling a gamble f for price r is the same thing as buy­
ing -f for price -r, we have the conjugacy relationship 
P(J) = - P(-f) between lower and upper previsions. 
Whatever we say about upper previsions can always be re­
formulated in terms of lower previsions. We therefore con­
centrate on lower previsions. It suffices for our purposes 
to consider lower previsions P that are defined on the set 
.C(X) of all gambles on X, i.e., P is considered as a func­
tion that maps any gamble f on X to the real number P(f). 
An event A is a subset of X, and it will be identified with its 
indi cator function lA· We denote P(IA) by P(A) and call 
it the lower probability of the event A. It is the supremum 
rate for which the subject is disposed to bet on the event A; 
and similarly for the upper probability P(A) = P(IA) = 
1- E.( co A). Thus, events are special gambles, and lower 
probabilities are special cases of lower previsions. We use 
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the more general language of gambles, because Walley [ 14] 
has shown that in the context of imprecise probabilities, it 
is much more expressive and powerful. 
Since lower previsions represent a subject's dispositions to 
act in certain ways, they should satisfy certain criteria that 
ensure that these dispositions are rational. Coherence is 
the strongest such requirement that is considered in the the­
ory of imprecise probabilities. For a detailed definition and 
motivation, we refer to [14]. For our purposes, it suffices 
to expose the connections between coherent lower previ­
sions and linear previsions, which are the coherent previ­
sions in de Finetti's sense [3]. A linear prevision P on 
,G(X) is a real-valued map on L(X) satisfying the following 
properties: (i) minxEX f(x)::; P(f) ::; maxxEX f(x); (ii) 
P(f +g) = P(f)+P(g); and (iii) P(.\f) = .\P(f); for all 
f and g in ,G(X), and all real numbers .\. Any linear previ­
sion Pis completely determined by its so-called mass func­
tion p, defined by p(x) = P( { x} ) , since it follows from the 
axioms that for any gamble f, P(f) = I:xEX f(x)p(x). 
We denote the set of all linear previsions on £(X) by P(X). 
Linear previsions are the so-called precise probability mod­
els, which will turn out to be special cases of the more gen­
eral coherent imprecise probability models. 
With any lower prevision P on £(X), we can associate its 
set of dominating linear previsions: 
M(P) = {P E P(X): ('if E ,G(X)) (E_(f) :'0 P(f))} . 
It turns out that a lower prevision E on ,G (X) is coher­
ent if and only if M(P) of 0, and if moreover P is 
the lower envelope of M(E_): for all gambles f on X, 
E_(f) = inf { P(f): P E M(P) }. Conversely, the lower 
envelope E of any non-empty subset M of P(X) is a coher­
ent lower prevision. This tells us that working with coher­
ent lower previsions is equivalent to working with sets of 
linear previsions. Observe that for a coherent E_, we have 
that P(J) 2: P(f) for all f E ,G(X). 
There is a class of coherent lower previsions that deserves 
special attention. Consider a non-empty subset B of X. 
Then the vacuous lower prevision P B relati ve  to B is de­
fined by E_8(f) = infxEB f(x) for all gambles f on X. 
Verify that P 8 is a coherent lower prevision, and more­
over JYf(£8) = { P E P(X): P( B) = 1}. This tells us 
that P 8 is the smallest (most conservative) coherent lower 
prevision Eon ,G(X) that satisfies P(B) = 1. E_(B) = 1 
means that it is practically certain to the subject that X as­
sumes a value in B, since he is prepared to bet at all odds 
on this event. Thus, P 8 is the appropriate model for the 
piece of information that 'X assumes a value in B' and 
nothing more: any other coherent lower prevision P that 
satisfies P(B) = 1 dominates P 8, and therefore repre­
sents stronger behavioural dispositions than those required 
by coherence and this piece of information alone. 
To introduce the concept of a conditional lower prevision, 
consider any gamble h on X and any value y in the finite 
set 1i of possible values for another random variable Y. A 
subject's conditional/ower prevision E_(hiY = y), also de­
noted as P(hly), is his lower prevision for h if he knew in 
addition that the variable Y assumes the value y (and noth­
ing more!). We denote by P(hjY) the gamble on 1i that 
assumes the value E_(h!Y = y) = P(hly) in y E 11. We 
can for the purposes of this paper assume that E_( hi Y) is 
defined for all gambles h on X, and we call E_( ·I Y) a condi­
tional lower prevision on ,G(X). Observe that P(-IY) maps 
any gamble h on X to the gamble P(hiY) on 11. Condi­
tional lower previsions should of course also satisfy certain 
rationality criteria. £(-IY) is called separately coherent if 
for all y E 11, P (·I y) is a coherent lower prevision on ,G(X). 
If besides the (separately coherent) conditional lower pre­
vision P( ·IY) on ,G (X), the subject has also specified a co­
herent (unconditional) lower prevision P on ,G(X x 11), then 
P and P( ·IY) should in addition satisfy the consistency cri­
terion of joint coherence. A discussion of this rationality 
requirement is beyond the scope of this paper, but we refer 
to [14, Chapter 6] for a detailed discussion and motivation. 
There is an important and interesting procedure, called reg­
ular extension, that allows us to associate with any coher­
ent lower prevision P on £(X x 11) a (separately coherent) 
conditional lower prevision B( ·IY) that is jointly coherent 
with P: (i) if P(X x {y}) = 0, then B(·ly) is the vacuous 
lower prevision relative to X: B(hly) = infxEX h(x); and 
(ii) if P(X x {y}) > 0, then B(hly) is given by . { P(hlxx{y}) } mf P(X x {y}) : P E M(P), P(X x {y}) > 0 , 
where h is any gamble on X. Thus, B(hly) can be ob­
tained by applying Bayes' rule (whenever possible) to all 
the precise previsions in M(E_), and then taking the infi­
mum! Regular extension has been called divisive condi­
tioning by Seidenfeld et a!. [II]. The regular extension is 
the smallest (most conservative) conditional lower previ­
sion that is coherent with the joint P and satisfies an addi­
tional regularity condition [ 14, Appendix J]. 
We end this section with a discussion of decision-making 
using lower previsions. Suppose we have two actions a 
and b, whose outcome depends on the actual value that the 
variable X assumes in X. Let us denote by fa the gam­
ble on X representing the uncertain reward resulting from 
action a: a subject who takes action a receives fa(x) if 
the value of X turns out to be x. Similar remarks hold for 
fb· If the subject is uncertain about the value of X, it is 
not immediately clear which of the two actions he should 
prefer, unless fa point-wise dominates !b or vice versa, 
which we shall assume is not the case. Suppose that he 
has modelled this uncertainty by a coherent lower previ­
sion on £(X). Then he strictly prefers action a to action 
b, which we denote as a > b, if he is willing to pay some 
strictly positive amount in order to exchange the (uncer­
tain) rewards of b for those of a. Using the behavioural 
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definition of the lower prevision P, this can be written as 
a > b {? E.Ua -!b) > 0. If P is a linear prevision P, 
this is equivalent to P(Ja) > P(Jb): the subject strictly 
prefers the action with the highest expected reward. It is 
easy to see that P(Ja - fb) > 0 can also be written as 
(VP E M.(P))(P(Ja) > P(Jb)). In other words, a > b 
iff action a yields a higher expected reward than b for every 
linear prevision compatible with P. 
3 Incomplete observations 
We are now ready to describe our basic model for dealing 
with incomplete observations. Consider a random variable 
X that may assume values in a finite set X. Suppose that we 
have some model for the available information about what 
value X will assume in X. which takes the form of a coher­
ent lower prevision Eo defined on ,C (X). We now receive 
additional information about the value of X by observing 
the value that another random variable 0 assumes in a fi­
nite set <9. Only, these observations are incomplete in the 
following sense: the value of 0 does not allow us to iden­
tify the value of X uniquely. In fact, the only information 
we have about the relationship between X and 0 is the fol­
lowing: if we know that X assumes the value x in X, then 
we know that 0 must assume a value in a non-empty sub­
set r(x) of <9, and nothing more! This idea of modelling 
incomplete observations through a so-called multi-valued 
map r essentially goes back to Strassen [13]. 
If we observe the value o of 0, then we know something 
more about X: it can then only assume values in the set 
{o}* = {x EX: o E f(x)} of those values of X that may 
produce the observation 0 = o. Unless { o} * is a single­
ton, the observation 0 = o does not allow us to identify a 
unique value for X; it only allows us to restrict the possi­
ble values of X to { o} *. The question we want to answer 
here, is how we can use the new information that 0 = o to 
coherently update the prior lower prevision Eo on ,C(X) to 
a posterior lower prevision P(·IO = o) = E(·lo) on ,C(X). 
In order to do this, we need to model the available informa­
tion about the relationship between X and 0, i.e., about the 
so-called incompleteness mechanism that turns the values 
of X into their incomplete observations 0. In the special 
case that Eo is a (precise) linear prevision Po (with mass 
function Po), it is often assumed that this mechanism obeys 
the CAR condition: p(olx) = p(oly) for all o E <9 and all 
x andy in {o}* such thatp0(x) > 0 andpo(Y) > 0 (see 
[4, 5] for an extensive discussion and detailed references). 
It is assumed that the probability of observing 0 = o is 
not affected by the specific values x of X that may actually 
lead to this observation o. However, Grunwald and Halpern 
[5] have argued convincingly that CAR is a very strong as­
sumption, that will only be justified in very special cases. 
We want to refrain from making such unwarranted assump­
tions in general: we want to find out what can be said about 
the posterior P(-10) if no assumptions are made about the 
incompleteness mechanism, apart from those present in the 
definition of the multi-valued map r. This implies that any­
one making additional assumptions (such as CAR) about 
the incompleteness mechanism will find results that are 
compatible but stronger, i.e., will find a posterior (lower) 
prevision that point-wise dominates ours. 
We have argued in the previous section that the appropriate 
model for the piece of information that '0 assumes a value 
in f(x)' is the vacuous lower prevision Pqx) on £,(<9) rel­
ative to the set f( x). So we can model the relationship 
between X and 0 through the following (vacuous) condi­
tional lower prevision P(·IX) on £,(<9), defined by 
P(glx) = Pr(x) (g) = inf g(o) (1) 
oEr(x) 
for any gamble g on <9 and x E X. Using regular extension, 
we can now find the smallest (most conservative) condi­
tional lower prevision R(-1 0) that is coherent with Eo and 
E.(- IX), and satisfies an additional regularity condition. 
Theorem 1. Let o E <9 and let f be any gamble on 
X. If P({o}*)) = 0 then R(J io) = minxEXf(x). If 
Po( { o }*) > 0, then R(J io) is the greatest value of JHuch 
that, with {o}. = {x E X: r(x) = {o}}, 
Eo (I{o), ma.x{f- 11-• 0} +I{ a)• min{!- 11-, 0}) 2: 0. 
Let us now apply the results of this theorem to the well­
known Monty Hall puzzle. In the Monty Hall game show, 
there are three doors. One of them leads to a car, and the re­
maining doors each have a goat behind them. You indicate 
one door, and the show's host-let us caii him Monty­
now opens one of the other doors, which has a goat behind 
it. After this observation, should you choose to open the 
door that is left, rather than the one you indicated initially? 
To solve the puzzle, we formulate it in our language of in­
complete observations. Label the doors from I to 3, and as­
sume without loss of generality that you picked door 1. Let 
the variable X refer to the door hiding the car, then clearly 
X= {1, 2, 3}. There is a precise prior prevision P0 deter­
mined by Po(1) = Po(2) = Po(3) = 1/3. The observa­
tion variable 0 refers to the door Monty opens, and conse­
quently <9 = { 2, 3}. If the car is behind door I, Monty can 
choose between opening doors 2 and 3, so r(1) = {2, 3}, 
and similarly, f(2) = {3} and f(3) = {2}. Since we don't 
know how Monty will choose between the options open to 
him, we should use Eq. (I) to model the available informa­
tion about his choices (the incompleteness mechanism). 
Assume without loss of generality that Monty opens door 
2. If we apply Theorem l, we find after some manipula­
tions that R(JI2) = V(3) + ! min{f(3),j(l)}. Which 
of the two actions should we choose: stick to our initial 
choice and open door I (action a), or open door 3 instead 
(action b)? In Table I we see the possible outcomes of each 
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car 
goat 
-� 
2 3 
goat 
goat 
0 
goat 
car 
� 
Table l: Possible outcomes in the Monty hall puzzle 
action for the three possible values of X. If the gamble fa 
on X represents the uncertain reward received from action 
a, and similarly for fb, then we are interested in the gam­
ble fb - f a• which represents the uncertain reward from 
exchanging action a for action b. This gamble is also in 
Table 1, where � > 0 denotes the difference in utility be­
tween a car and a goat. Then we find that Jl(fb- fa/2) = 0 
and ll(fa- !b/2) = -�. This implies that, with the nota­
tions established at the end of the previous section, a 'f b 
and b 'f a: the available information does not allow us to 
say which of the two actions, sticking to door 1 (action a) 
or choosing door 3 (action b), is to be strictly preferred. 
The same conclusion can also be reached as follows. Sup­
pose first that Monty has decided on beforehand to always 
open door 3 when the car is behind door 1. Since he has 
actually opened door 2, the car cannot be behind door 1, 
and must therefore be behind door 3. In this case, action b 
is clearly strictly preferable to action a. Next, suppose that 
Monty has decided on beforehand to always open door 2 
when the car is behind door 1. Since he actually opens door 
2, there are two equally likely possibilities, namely that the 
car is behind door 1 or behind door 3. Both actions now 
have the same expected reward (zero), and none is therefore 
strictly preferable to the other. Since both possibilities are 
consistent with the available information, we cannot infer 
any (robust) strict preference of one action over the other. 
A similar analysis was made by Halpern [6]. 
Observe that since Jl(fb - fa/2) = 0, you almost-prefer 
b to a, in tbe sense that you are disposed to exchange fa 
for !b in return for any strictly positive amount. In the 
case that Monty could also decide not to open any door, 
a similar analysis tells us that the updated lower previ­
sion is given by Jl(f/2) = min{f(1), f(3)}, and we get 
R(fb - /a/2) = ll(fa - !b/2) = -�: neither option is 
even almost-preferred, let alone strictly preferred, over the 
other. 
4 Missing data in a classification problem 
In order to illustrate the practical implications of our model 
for the incompleteness mechanism, let us in the rest of this 
paper show how it can be applied in classification prob­
lems, where objects have to be assigned to a certain class 
on the basis of tbe values of their attributes. 
Let in such a problem e be the set of possible classes that 
we want to assign objects to. Let A1, ... , An be the sets 
of possible values for the n attributes on the basis of which 
we want the classify the objects. We denote their Carte­
sian product by X = A1 x · · · x An. We consider a 
class variable C, which is a random variable in e, and 
attribute variables Ako which are random variables in Ak 
(k = 1, . . .  , n). Then-tuple X = (A1, ... , An) is a ran­
dom variable in X and is called the attributes variable. The 
available information about the relationship between class 
and attribute variables is specified by a (prior) linear previ­
sion Po on .c(e x X). 
Classification is done as follows: if the attributes variable 
X assumes a value x in X, then the available information 
about the values of the class variable C is clearly given by 
the conditional linear prevision Po (./x). If, on the basis of 
the observed value x of the attributes variable X, we decide 
that some c' in e is the right class, then we can see this clas­
sification as an action with an uncertain reward fc•, whose 
value /c• (c) depends on the actual value c of the class vari­
able C. The discussion at the end of Section 2 then tells 
us that an optimal class Copt is one that maximises the ex­
pected reward PoUc•/x) over all c' E e. As an example, if 
we let /c• = I{c'}• then PoUc• /x) = Po(c'/x), and this pro­
cedure associates the most probable class with each value 
x of the attributes. 
To make this more clear, let us consider a medical domain, 
where classification is employed to make a diagnosis. In 
this case, the classes are possible diseases and each at­
tribute variable represents a measure with random outcome. 
For example, attribute variables might represent medical 
tests, or information about the patient, such as age, gen­
der, life style, etc. We can regard tbe specific instance of 
the vector of attribute variables for a patient as a profile 
by which we characterise the person under examination. 
The relationship between diseases and profiles is given by a 
joint mass function on the class and the attribute variables. 
This induces a linear prevision Po on .c(e x X), according 
to Section 2. A diagnosis is then obtained by choosing the 
most probable disease given a profile. 
Now it may happen that for a patient some of the attribute 
variables cannot be measured, i.e., they are missing, as 
when for some reason a medical test cannot be done. In 
this case the profile is incomplete and we can regard it as 
the set of all the complete profiles that are consistent with 
it. The problem that we face is how we should update our 
confidence about the possible diseases given a set-profile, 
as the above classification procedure needs profiles to be 
complete. 
In more general terms, we observe or measure the value ak 
of some of the attribute variables Ak, but not all of them. If 
a measurement is lacking for some attribute variable Ae, it 
can in principle assume any value in Ae. We formalise this 
by associating with any attribute variable Ak a so-called 
observation variable Ok. This is a random variable taking 
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values in the set Ok == Ak U { * }, whose elements are ei­
ther the possible values of Ak, or a new element * which 
denotes that the measurement of Ak is missing. 
Attribute variables Ak and their observations Ok are linked 
in the following way: with each possible value ak E Ak 
of Ak there corresponds the following set of possible val­
ues forOk: fk(ak) == {ak,*} <;;; Ok. This models that 
whatever value ak the attribute variable Ak assumes, there 
is some mechanism, called the missing data mechanism, 
that either produces the (exact) observation ak. or the ob­
servation *· which indicates that a value for Ak is missing. 
For the attributes variable X we then have that with each 
possible value x == (a1, ... , an) there corresponds a set 
f(x) == f1(a1) X··· X fn(an) of corresponding possible 
values for the obser vations variable 0 == ( 01, .. . , On) . 
which assumes vaiues in 0 == 01 x · · · x On. 
So, in general, we observe some value o == (o1, ... , on) of 
the variable 0, where ok is either the observed value for 
the k-th attribute, or * if a value for this attribute is miss­
ing. In order to perform classification, we therefore need to 
calculate a coherent updated lower prevision E(-10 == o) 
on [,(e). This is what we now set out to do. 
We have arrived at a special case of the model in the pre­
vious section, and the so-called missing data mechanism is 
a particular instance of the incompleteness mechanism de­
scribed there. In this special case, it is easy to verify that the 
general CAR assumption, discussed previously, reduces to 
what is known in the literature as the MAR assumption [8]. 
MAR finds appropriate justification in some statistical ap­
plications, e.g., special types of survival analysis. However, 
there is strongly motivated criticism about the unjustified 
wide use of MAR in statistics, and there are well-developed 
methods based on much weaker assumptions [9]. 
As in the previous section, we want to refrain from mak­
ing any strong assumptions about the mechanism that is 
behind the generation of missing values. We have argued 
before that the information in r, i.e., the information about 
the relationship between X and 0, can be represented by 
the conditional lower prevision E(·IX) on £,(0), defined 
by Eq. (1). We make the following additional irrelevance 
assumption: for all gambles f on e, 
E(flx, o) ==Po (fix) for all X E :X and 0 E r(x). (I) 
Assumption (I) states that, conditional on the attributes 
variable X, the observations variable 0 is irrelevant to the 
class. In other words. the observations o E f(x) can in­
fluence our beliefs on the class only indirectly through the 
value x of the attributes variable X, i.e., we are actually 
dealing with a problem of missing information. Note that 
the assumption is not restrictive in practise: if the fact that 
an attribute is missing can directly influence our beliefs on 
the class, then the related state * should not be regarded 
as missing information, rather, as a possible value of the 
attribute, and it should be treated accordingly. 
We can use regular extension to obtain the conditional 
lower prevision .R(·IO) on .C(e). It is the smallest (rnost 
conservative) separately coherent conditional lower previ­
sion that is jointly coherent with Po and P(·IX), and takes 
into account the irrelevance assumption (I). 3 
Theorem 2 (Conservative updating rule). Assume that 
irrelevance assumption (I) holds. Let o be any element 
of 0. If Po({x}) > Ofor all x E {o}*, then R(flo) 
minx, oH(x) Po(flx) for all J in .C(e). 
Let us now denote by E that part of the attributes variable 
X that is instantiated, i.e., for which actual values are avail­
able. We denote its value by e. Let R denote the other part, 
for whose components values are missing. We denote the 
set of its possible values by ::R, and a generic element of that 
set by r. Then with some abuse of notation, o = (c, *),and 
{ o} * == { e} x ::R. We then deduce from Theorem 2 that 
R(fle,*) ==minP0(fle,r) 
rE:R 
(2) 
for all gambles f on e, provided that Po(e, r) > 0 for all 
r E ::R, which we shall assume to be the case. We shall call 
Eq. (2) the conser vati v e  updating rule. 
In the case of the earlier medical example, e denotes the 
part of the profile that is known for a patient and the same 
incomplete profile can be regarded as the set { (e, r) lr E ::R} 
of complete profiles that are consistent with it. The con­
servative updating rule tells us that in order to update our 
beliefs on the possible diseases given the incomplete pro­
file, we have to consider all the complete profiles consis­
tent with it, giving rise to lower and upper probabilities and 
previsions. In tum, this will generally give rise to partial 
classifications, according to the consideration about deci­
sion making in Section 2. That is, in general we will only 
be able to exclude some of the possible diseases given the 
evidence. This rnay give rise to a single disease, but only 
when the conditions justify precision. 
The conservative updating rule is our main result: it pro­
vides us with the correct updating rule to use with an un­
known incompleteness mechanism. It shows that robust, 
conservative, inference can be achieved by relying only on 
the original prior model of domain uncertainty. 
5 Classification in expert systems with 
Bayesian networks 
One popular way of doing classification in complex real­
world domains involves using B ayesian networks (BNs). 
These are precise probabilistic models defined by a directed 
acyclic graph and a collection of conditional mass func­
tions [10]. A generic node Z in the graph is identified 
with a random variable. Each variable Z holds a collection 
3 And moreover satisfies an additional weak regularity condi­
tion, without which we would get completely vacuous inferences. 
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Figure I: The 'Asia' Bayesian network. 
of conditional mass functions, one for each possible joint 
value 1rz of its direct predecessor nodes (or parents) IIz. 
The generic conditional mass function assigns the proba­
bility Po({z}[7rz ) = Po(z[7rz ) to any valuez in Z. 
Figure I displays the well-known example of a Bayesian 
network called 'Asia' .4 It models an artificial medical prob­
lem by means of cause-effect relationships between ran­
dom variables, e.g., S -+ C (each variable is denoted by 
the related letter between parentheses). The variables are 
binary and for any given variable, for instance V, its two 
possible values are denoted by v' and v", for the values 
'yes' and 'no', respectively. The conditional probabilities 
for the variables of the model are reported in Table 2. 
v v' 0.01 
s s 0.5 
v 
T t' 0.05 0.01 
s 
c c' 0.1 0.01 
s 
H-h' 0.6 0.3 
tc tc t c  t c  
L l' 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.05 
tch tch tc h tc h  t ch t ch t c h t c h  
D = d' 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.1 
Table 2: Asia example: probabilities for each variable in 
the graph conditional on the values of the parent variables. 
Bayesian nets satisfy the Markov condition: every variable 
is stochastically independent of its non-descendant non­
parents given its parents. Using the generic notation es­
tablished in Section 4, assume the Bayesian network has 
nodes C, A1, ... , An. From the Markov condition, it fol­
lows that the probability p0 ( c, a1, ... , an) of a joint in­
stance is given by Po(c[7rc) TI7=1po(a;[7rA.J, where the 
values of the parent variables are those consistent with 
(c, a1, ... , an)· Hence, a BN is equivalent to a joint mass 
function over the variables of the graph. We assume that it 
assigns a strictly positive probability to any event. 
Bayesian nets play an important role in the design of expert 
systems. Domain experts are supposed to provide both the 
qualitative graphical structure and the numerical values for 
4The network presented here is equivalent to the traditional 
one although it is missing a logical OR node. 
the probabilities, thus implicitly defining an overall model 
of the prior uncertainty for the domain of interest. Users 
can then query the expert system, resulting in an update of 
the marginal prior probability of C to a posterior probabil­
ity according to the available evidence E = e, i.e., a set 
of nodes with known values. This kind of updating is very 
useful as it enables users to do classification, as we explain 
further on. In the Asia net, one might ask for the updated 
probability of lung cancer (C = c'), given that a patient is a 
smoker (S = s') and has abnormal X-rays (L = l'), aiming 
ultimately at finding the proper diagnosis for the patient. 
Updating the uncertainty for the class variable in a 
Bayesian net is subject to the considerations concerning in­
complete observations in the preceding sections, as gener­
ally the evidence set E will not contain all the attributes. To 
address this problem, one can assume that MAR holds and 
compute p0(cfe), but we have already pointed out that this 
approach is likely to be problematical in real applications. 
Explicitly modelling the missing data mechanism is an­
other way to cope with the problem, perhaps involving the 
same Bayesian net. The net would then also comprise the 
nodes oko k = 1' .. . 'n, for the observations; and the pos­
terior probability of interest would become p(cfo). Un­
fortunately, this approach presents serious practical diffi­
culties. Modelling the mechanism can be as complex as 
modelling the prior uncertainty. Furthermore, it can be ar­
gued that in contrast with domain knowledge (e.g., medical 
knowledge), the way information can be accessed depends 
on the particular environment where a system will be used; 
and this means that models of the missing data mechanism 
will probably not be re-usable, and therefore costly. 
These considerations support adopting a robust approach 
that can be effectively implemented, like the one we pro­
posed in Section 4. We next develop an algorithm that ex­
ploits Eq. (2) to perform reliable classification with BNs. 
6 An algorithm to classify incomplete 
evidence with BNs 
How can we use the updated lower prevision P(- fe, *) to 
perform classification? As in the case of a precise pos­
terior Po(·!x) , we associate a reward function I{c') with 
each class c' in e, and we look for those classes c that are 
undominated elements of the strict partial order > on e, 
defined by (see Section 2) 
c' > c" {o} R(I{c')- l{c"j[e, *) > 0 
. Po(c',e,r) 1 {o}ffilll > ' rE:R Po(c'',e,r) (3) 
where we have used Eq. (2), Bayes' rule, and the assump­
tion that Po ( e, r) > 0 for all r in�. It is important to realise 
that the new updating will not always allow two classes to 
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be compared, i.e., Eq. (2) generally produces only a par­
tial order on the classes. As a consequence, the classifica­
tion procedure consists in comparing each pair of classes 
by strict preference (also called credal dominance in [ 16]) 
and in discarding the dominated ones. The system will then 
output a set of possible, undominated classes. Classifiers 
with this characteristic are also called credal classifiers. In 
the following we address the efficient computation of the 
credal dominance test (3). 
Let rr' and rr" denote values of the parent variables consis­
tent with (c',e,r) and (c",e,r), respectively. If a node's 
parents do not contain C, let rr denote the value of the par­
ent variables consistent with ( e, r ). Furthermore, without 
loss of generality, let A1, • . •  , Am, m ::; n, be the children 
of C, and K = {1, . .. , m}. Let B be the Markov blanket 
of C, t.i}at is, the set of nodes consisting of the parents of 
C, its children, and the parents of the children of C. 
Consider a total order on the children of C that extends 
the partial order given by the arcs of the graph, i.e., when 
Ai --+ Aj is interpreted as: Ai precedes Aj in the partial 
order. By permuting the subscripts we can always say that 
the total order is just A1 --+ A2 --+ · · · --+ Am. Let Ao = 
C. For each i = 0, ... , m, let rrt =ITA, U {A;}, and for 
i E K let II:4, = U�:� ITt. Now let 
. [Po(c'lrrc) J JlAo = mm ( "I )J.LA, a,EA;, Po c Trc A;EllcnR (4) 
Note that J.LA,, i = 1, ... , m, are not constants in general 
but functions of some attribute variables, as the minimisa­
tion does not always involve all the attributes of which the 
argument of J.LA, is function. 
Theorem 3. Consider a BN with nodes C, A1, ... , An. 
Let c', c" E e. Then c' credal-dominates c" if and only if 
J1Ao > 1, where J.LAo is the optimal solution ofEq. (4). 
Theorem 3 renders the solution of the credal-dominance 
test very easy, in a dynamic programming fashion. One 
starts by computing the last minimum J.L A=. The produced 
function is multiplied by the preceding ratio and the new 
function J.LA=_, is evaluated. The process continues un­
til J1Ao (i.e., J.Lc) is computed. The overall computational 
complexity is O(m + 1). 
As an example, consider the Asia net, where we choose C 
as the class. Its Markov blanket of C is { S, L, D, T, H}. 
The graph presents no relationship of order between L and 
D, and we arbitrarily choose L --+ D. Then we set the 
evidence to L = l' and S = s'. 
We want to test whether c' credal-dominates c". We start 
by computing 
(t)
- . Po(djt,c',h) J.LD - mm 
(dj " h) dE'D,hE11: p0 t, c , 
We have J.LD(t') = min{Z:�, g:�. g:, g:n  = 1 and 
J.LD (t") min { g:�, Z:i, Z:�, g:�} = � · Next, we com-
pute 
. [Po(l'jt,c') J J.LL = �IJj Po(l'jt, c") J.LD (t) . 
We have J.LL = min { Z:�� 1, g 6� �} = 1. Finally, we com­
pute 
Po(c'js') 0.1 1 J.Lc = J.LL p0(c"js') = 10.9 = g· 
As J.Lc is not greater than 1, c" is undominated. 
Testing whether c" credal-dominates c' is very similar and 
leads to J.Lc = 6�6, so c' is undominated as well. In this 
situation, the system suspends judgement, i.e., it outputs 
both the classes, as there is not enough information to allow 
us to choose between the two. This should be contrasted 
with traditional updating, which produces Po( c'll', s') � 
0.646, and leads us to diagnose cancer. 
It is useful to better analyse the reasons for the indetermi­
nate output of the proposed system. Given our assump­
tions, the system cannot exclude that the available evi­
dence, or incomplete profile, is part of a more complete 
profile where T = t', D = d', and H = h'. If this were the 
case, then c" would be nine times as probable a posteriori 
as c', and we should diagnose no cancer. However, the sys­
tem cannot exclude either that the more complete profile 
would beT= t", D = d', and H = h". In this case, the 
ratio of the posterior probability of c' to that of c" would 
be �856, leading us to the opposite diagnosis. 
Of course when the evidence is strong enough, the pro­
posed system does produce determinate conclusions. For 
instance, the incomplete profile given by L = l', S = s' 
and T = t', will lead the system to exclude the presence of 
cancer. 
7 Conclusions 
We have proposed a conservative rule for updating proba­
bilities with incomplete observations when strong assump­
tions about the incompleteness mechanism cannot be jus­
tified, thus filling an important gap in literature. We have 
achieved this result by coherent lower previsions, following 
an approach very similar in spirit to the Bayesian method. 
However, imprecise probabilities allowed us to work natu­
rally also with generalised priors, such as the vacuous prior, 
which are needed to model states of partial or total igno­
rance. Generalised priors are significantly more expressive 
than traditional priors: they enable a new set of difficult 
important problems to be addressed in an adequate and el­
egant manner, as this paper shows in an enlightening case. 
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By focusing on classification of new evidence we have 
shown that the conservative updating leads to a very effi­
cient implementation, also for multiply connected nets, so 
the new developments can immediately be exploited in real 
environments. Furthermore, the related algorithm can be 
implemented easily and does not require changes in pre­
existing knowledge bases, so that existing expert systems 
can be upgraded to make our robust, conservative, infer­
ences with minimal changes. 
The proposed updating strategy is different in one impor­
tant respect from the more traditional ones: it generally 
leads only to partially determinate inferences and deci­
sions, and ultimately to systems that can recognise the lim­
its of their knowledge, and suspend judgement when these 
limits are reached. As necessary consequences of our re­
fusal to make unwarranted assumptions, we believe that 
these limitations are important characteristics of the way 
systems ought to operate in the real world. A system that, 
in a certain state, cannot support any decision on the ba­
sis of its knowledge base, will induce a user to look for 
further sources of information externally to the system. In 
contrast, systems that may make arbitrary choices without 
making that evident, will wrongly lead a user to think that 
these choices are well motivated. 
An important subject for future research is the identifica­
tion of common intermediate states of knowledge about the 
incompleteness mechanism, that can be usefully modelled 
to derive stronger inferences and decisions than the ones 
described here. For Bayesian nets, one could think of par­
titioning the set of attributes in those for which MAR holds 
and the rest for which the mechanism is unknown. Such hy­
brid modelling seems a good compromise between gener­
ality and flexibility. It is also very useful to consider the ex­
tension of our treatment for Bayesian networks to the more 
general notion of a credal network [1]. Credal nets extend 
Bayesian nets in that they allow for imprecise probabil­
ity models (sets of probability distributions). They permit 
much more flexible modelling by weakening the require­
ment that prior knowledge should be represented by a pre­
cise probability distribution. Recent investigations make us 
confident about the extension of the present work to credal 
networks. 
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